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China 141, U.s. 36, United States 31, Us 17, Pla 14, Taiwan 14, India 12, Ashley 9, North Korea 7, Asia 6, Australia 6, South China 6, Newt Gingrich 5, Romney 4, America 4, South Korea 4, Eagleton 4, Navy 3, The Pla 3, Rnc 3,
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  CSPAN    U.S. Senate    News/Business.  

    October 3, 2012
    5:00 - 8:00pm EDT  

region in 24 countries and we're looking to expand that group. ..
in the beginning our thinking in technical preparations at an earlier stage. these reforms should make easier for us to cooperate with our partners across the region. to strengthen the regional missile posture with japan and australia and south korea missile defense approaches we are integrating japanese sensors into the space surveillance network and cooperating with australia on the space capabilities. we are enhancing our access and sustainment across the region in addition to rotational the deploying the combat ships in singapore as i mentioned earlier we are exploring options for training there. with of the philippines we're exploring options for the rotational deployments in priority areas. we are focused on prisons and capabilities and strengthening their maritime domain awareness. we are in tikrit ingalls
commissions and capabilities with japan and taking numerous steps to solidify our enduring presence on the creative peninsula we have our technology sharing and defense trade with india another state so important to our rebalanced and we believe to the broad security and prosperity of the 21st century. we believe that given the inherent links between india and the united states in values and political philosophy that the only limit to our cooperation with india should be our independent strategic decisions because any to states can defer. not a bureaucratic obstacles i
personally am working daily to remove these obstacles. we are working well beyond purely defense trade with india towards technology sharing and co-production. engagement with our allies and partners is a step to executing our rebalanced as if they help any of us achieve our original security objectives. fifth and last the defense department is turning its formidable innovative power to the asian-pacific region. the counterinsurgency that's of course we've gotten very good doing and which we are going to keep, but as we come out of iraq and afghanistan, defense planners, analysts, scientists and institutions across the country are devoting more and more of their time to thinking about the asia-pacific region.
we are developing new operational concepts for the forces. we are integrating operations on land in the air force and navy to maintain access in contested regions we are real making sure we are prepared for any opportunity for a challenge that may arise. the pentagon leadership is focused intently on executing the rebalanced. secretaries and leon panetta hosts a video teleconference but this is something new. this is something that secretary gates and then secretary leon panetta have been doing with commanders iraq and afghanistan as a way of keeping involved, keeping in touch, constantly consulting and working on issues and we've decided to do that
with admiral law cleared out in honolulu also to keep the tempo of our activities so that the defense department leadership to make decisions effectively and quickly about the asia-pacific region. i am conducting a defense department wide management review to support assess and implement all of those rebalanced initiatives. we are watching every dollar, every ship and a free plane to make sure that we execute our rebalancing effectively. so, in conclusion, we are not just talking the talk we are walking the walk even in a period of fiscal austerity we can and will invest in a continued military presence and engagement for the asia-pacific region for all the reasons and in all of the ways i outlined today. for each of our strategic initiatives we have had to make careful investment decisions and
we the costs and measure benefits. we are investing in the new capabilities we need for the future and to do so we have to let go of the and needed capabilities and make difficult calls on the underperforming programs to make way for new capabilities and a better performing programs. traces like this are of the essence of strategy. we are balancing our investments to meet our strategic objectives thank you very much for being here today inviting me to join you to read the woodrow wilson center you conduct a valuable public policy research and support of the national interest, and so as we execute the rebalanced we will continue to look to you to provide us with insights and analysis about this important region of the world. i know you will have some thoughts of your own and questions of your own and i welcome them.
congratulations again on all of your success and think you. [applause] >> we are extremely privileged to have you do a major address on the rebalancing year and i think we are all kind of impressed that the comprehensiveness of your remarks and deeply appreciative. i would now like to open this up to questions, and let me kind of search around here. can we start over year, the gentleman at the end of the row. >> i chose the gentleman furthest from the microphone. i apologize. [laughter] >> thanks for calling on me. the institute for foreign policy analysis. i wonder if the new leadership
in china and the relatively new leadership in north korea provide us with opportunities whether we can create opportunities for the cooperation and engagement. >> i think for china that is definitely the case. obviously that is not new leadership either to china or to us. many of those individuals we have known and worked with in the past and they have all indicated not only their willingness to their desire to continue to develop this relationship in a positive way economically, politically, but for us in the defense department and in the security cents. in the north -- north korea we will have to see. we have remained very concerned about so many dimensions, and
that is one of the reasons why we are so intent upon solidifying our posture, and that's the reason why we are looking at a number of steps in korea but i'm sure you are familiar with but i will remind you of what is going on. there we are making our presence, particularly the ground force presence putting it on a more permanent basis and more solid basis. that is what the relocation of the partnership program is all about. we are in the middle of executing them and making a number of improvements in the structure. a number of command-and-control arrangements with the government of the rok looking at the rate
plans are configured and making sure they are completely up-to-date. so we are doing a lot of accretive peninsula for a lot of reasons but one of them is in order to continue to keep the peace on the korean peninsula and we will have to see the leadership there. >> we actually -- >> i wanted to ask about the reaction in the region to the rebalancing, particularly given secretary panetta's contact with the chinese for those of us outside of the government appears to be a failing reaction talking about the containment for all the things we would say it's not that any insight you can share to try to persuade china that this is indeed the
region wanted initiative, and on the other side, for all the rest of the people in the region the question of how credible is the pivot or rebalancing people are looking at all of the chinese naval activities and south china sea and the east china sea and what we say to them? >> stanley you have hit it on the head. overall, i think the reaction has been positive among old friends and new friends, but there are two questions that come up. the one i addressed specifically today is are you going to do this or not, are you going to walk the walk or just talk the talk? i told you why we are going to walk the walk and if you don't believe it just watch the steps. that's all i can say on that one. on the issue of containing china again you have to watch what happens and i will say the chinese friends that have that concern many understand the point and the logic. to those that have concerns i
would say the same thing. watch the steps. the steps we want to take are ones that are cooperative and reaching out. we are trying to do more with the chinese military and make the chinese military part of the security next. but we are the essentials part of but not the only part of that which has kept a good thing going for 70 years in that part of the world. it's been that environment in which these tremendous economic transformations of one nation state after another can take place. we welcome that and we think that is a good thing. we want to keep going with that. that's what it's all about. on both of those questions all i can say is watch. >> one more question, how about in the back with the hand raised. i'm trying to be equal opportunity in this audience.
>> tom referred for the malaysia and the world of affairs council. you talk about the need for peaceful resolution of disputes. i wondered if you could elaborate a bit about what stand referred to in the south china and the east china where the assertiveness is causing so much concern. >> we see that and i think we have a very principled position on all of this. first of all, people say we don't take sides in these disputes but it's not true, we actually do. when we take a side for freedom of navigation and peaceful resolution of these disputes. that's where we are going to stay. we don't always have a direct
intermediating role. by understand that. but that's what i talk about the american position in the region's beginning from principal that's a good example of it and our principle is equal access and peaceful resolution devotee for all of the estates that have all of these historic disputes these have to be kept in proportion. the big game is peace and security that allows prosperity and development and to endanger that for small things is not in anybody's interest. everybody needs to keep that in perspective and to keep the freedom of navigation game, everybody can play better now the world, and down that road thalia's trouble for everybody. so, our position is pretty clear
and it is related to the rebalanced because it sets up a vision of what the security system in that part of the world ought to be, and i think if people keep this in proportion, they will realize not to sacrifice the big game not for the little game. >> is their anything you want to say specifically he asked about the south china sea? how about the maritime difficulty disputes particularly between japan, china, anything specific? >> same principal, same thing and a different set of parties in that particular case, somewhat different history.
it indicates that this is a part of the world where many historic animosities never dispelled, wounds were never properly healed after world war ii and beyond and didn't have the experience that europe had with nado which remember took decades itself to heal these things so that is another task before us and another reason to have the kind of cooperative security structure in the region that i'm talking out and that the united states seeks so that over time these things can be cut the lead kaput to mind and people can march on to the future that they're people really deserved. >> tremendous thanks and a tremendous job. we are pleased to have you here.
thank you so much on behalf of everyone and we really appreciate you coming. [applause] >> thank you every day. i think i can trust that you all would agree with me that we had a wonderful kick off to this morning's session. again our deepest thanks to the wilson center and deputy secretary carter for the wonderful remarks that he gave this morning. - travis tanner and i'm the director of the national bureau of research and it's my pleasure to introduce our first panel today. and the topic of today's discussion. i just wanted to make a couple of the introductory remarks about this year's ball room. as mentioned earlier this is the 12th volume in the series. and in a way, this book represents the culmination of research undertaken by the strategic asia research program over the last several years. two years ago when the tenth
anniversary volume, the rising power and america's continued purpose we sought to provide a big picture and assessment of the major trends and the key issues influencing peace and stability in the region. the book addresses topics such as energy and resource nationalism, strategic competition in the global commons and looked at demographic issues in the region, sought to understand the future of the nuclear energy in asia as well as many other topics. and then last year our volume build upon this research framework but narrowed the focus to examine the rising powers china and india, and specifically the challenges and opportunities presented by the remarkable growth of the major powers to read than this year's strategic volume the military challenge we have sought to refine our research agenda by examining one of the most immediate challenges stemming from china's rise and that is
the advancing military capabilities and its strategic ambitions. last december once we haven't decided on the particular topic or theme for the book we sought to identify the very best and brightest scholars in the respective fields to come together to address this important topic with such wide-ranging implications. we were successful in bringing together an absolutely phenomenon research team this year among the book to address this important topic, and we are very blessed today to have several of those authors with us to address this shortly. now we designed this year's book to perform several tasks. first we want to provide a baseline assessment of china's military capabilities, and the projection of how these capable of these will likely evolves over the coming decade. second we sought to understand the strategic motivations behind
china's military modernization and how these fit into the country's overall strategic vision. we want to survey and understand the regional attitudes and perceptions and the reactions to china's military rise and in essence we wanted to answer the question help with the other major asian powers reacting and responding to china's advancing military strength. the important implications for the united states interest in the asia-pacific specifically addressing and assessing the rebalancing policy like the under secretary addressed this morning. and i firmly believe the book succeeds in endorsing the tasks we set out for that. i have to thank authors for but several of whom are with me on the stage today and we are
grateful for the diligent efforts that they've put forth to produce this important work. before i entered is the man turned time over to them i want to just echo a point that was made in the introductory remarks and that is to express the deepest appreciation to the research director behind this who we worked with for many years and we will have the good fortune of hearing from the second panel today the intellectual leadership tralee is the region of the strategic asia series is such an important and vital resource today, so thank you ashley. i would now like to introduce the panelists. this panel will specifically be looking at china's current and developing military capabilities and we have a very good fortune of having with us roy kamphausen of the bureau of researc andrew erickson anĂ­bal war college. mark stokes with the project 24 united institute and kevin pollpeter from the defense group incorporated. we've asked each of the authors to highlight the key research
findings and analysis from the chapters and keep remarks allegedly breaks we can have reaction from the audience and without further ado i would like to turn the tide over to roy. >> thank you, travis and for your leadership of the volume and thanks to josh and greg and it's a team in the several months. i'm the son of a baptist minister and i am especially heartened to know we had such a great turnout today that we have an overflow room and that brings back fond memories from when i was a kid. so over in the overflow room welcome. we are glad you are here my charter was to talk about the ground forces. and as we know the ground force in china's military occupied a central place in the national security industry. it was the ground force that ended the century of humiliation at the hand of foreign invaders
and a central place in the national security psyche of the chinese people in the chinese communist party. there's a special bond that exists between the people of china and the people's liberation army. the early missions reflected a ground force intensive approach to the national security, national defense commissions that were hardly unique for may post revolutionary consolidating power and missions that could be accomplished with existing resources mainly to defend the territory from invasion to contribute to the national construction and modernization and defend the chinese communist party leadership. by the mid-1980s, the ground forces have become a bloated force of nearly 4 million strong large infantry based formations
that were static defensive and geographically based. this chapter assesses what has changed over the intervening decades and how we should think about the drivers that have forced the change and the important developments and how the pla presents itself to the neighbors and what future developments we might see. the five key takeaways from the chapter and the my lai light up front to read the first is we can appreciate china's national security objectives have moved well beyond simply limited continental defense of objectives and necessarily second, it remains the case to the ground force retains the traditional mission and the defense of sovereignty and as the last line of defense for the chinese communist party. third, it needed the ground
force has modernized and so the key developments particularly in the tactical mobility, the integration of secure communications battlefield situational awareness and so forth as well as the naval peabody's and improvements in its system structural reforms and so forth. the chapter fourth finds the pla is tailoring the ground force approaches to its each of the subregions that border china, and i will talk briefly about this. and then last week we anticipate the important reforms in the high level military region structure that the pla is organized under and this will have important implications for the potential increase in the chinese expeditionary power. briefly what were the key changes that occurred in the timeframe that have really been drivers for the modernization
particularly the ground force? first, trademark and minn square, june of 1989. the pla did follow orders and use brutal and deadly force to enter and clear that cnn and square of the students and workers and others who had occupied it, but this move was not without cost for the party and center. they vowed never to do this again, and in response we've seen several important developments. of course an immediate one is to reinforce the and strengthening of the role of the people's police, the paramilitary force who is now a charter to deal with the unrest among other things. but it remains the case that the pla is the last line and it is a mission that dare not speak its name but the pla has and the open question is what is the response in the face of a future as large scale as we saw before.
the second important drivers the dissolution of the soviet union. at the political level we often talk about the lesson of the chinese leadership learned which is the soviets reversed the order of reform. the soviets but political reform first in economic and china wouldn't make that mistake but in the defense and security level, what happened as a result of the disillusionment of the soviet union was a total dimunation of the strategic threat china faced on the borders they've begun before the soviet union accelerated thereafter and the borders were secure, confidence-building measures set up and then within a very short period of time a regional structure known as the meshaal hyatt to the -- shaw hyde and was under this structure that the ground forces were able to join with its partners in central asia in a new mission, which is response to counterterrorism.
the end of the soviet challenge also allowed for the strategic reorientation of the china's eastern seaboard. it's where china's five major wall centers are and it allowed for 83energizing of china's deterrents of the movement, and it also necessarily lead to an increase in the importance of emissions of the navy and air force. the success of the u.s. and persian gulf war, the first persian gulf war the experience shock at the synergistic way in which the u.s.-led coalition spectacularly applied technology to the modern warfare. the fourth key driver has been the incredible development of the chinese economy that has allowed for and paid for the more than sevenfold increase in the chinese defense spending over the two decades.
so, the pla today is a force that continues to emphasize its traditions, but also it has new ones. as we know, president hu jintao has talked about the historic missions which both reiterate the old and talk about the role of the global setting. the only part of which applies to the land forces as they've been increasingly participants in the u.n. peacekeeping operations. there's been some important developments in technology for the ground forces, particularly the two most important are the and provide in the tactical ability of the pla land force which is to say we now think there are less than five divisions that do not have a motorized or mechanized capability but this tactical mobility hasn't been matched by the improved cable the helicopter or air mobility and this remains a significant shortcoming. pla has also spent a great deal of time working on the information on its force which
is the improvement or the leveraging of information communication technologies to know where i am or where my forces are or where my adversaries are and to integrate the sensors and the means of addressing the targets in a highly synchronous the quay. the pla also interested in programs, personnel programs to improve the quality of its officers and soldiers perhaps most importantly is the leveraging of china's best civilian universities to commission a two about of hundred little sense not from a chinese style people's liberation army rotc structure and restructured to a new brigade which is important ramifications as well. so the 20 year retrospective would say that maybe there's four important changes in the
ground forces and they are worthy of noting. the first is in my judgment the pla can now rapidly reinforce with up to the brigade sires element anywhere within china on very short notice. now to an american the sun hardly remarkable but it is an important change from china's perspective and i think it speaks to how the pla sees its role as providing the ability throughout china up to its borders. second, the pla is increasingly comfortable conducting highly sophisticated trans regional exercises which reinforce the notion of mobility within itself. the pla is comfortable in participating and sometimes leading the multilateral exercise is particularly with its shy cooperation organizational partners and finally, the pla will continue to make investments and force multiplier components of advanced personal training and
joined logistics in the structures and so forth. finally, how the pla presents itself to its regional neighbors. to russia, china presents itself as a security partner and confidence building and in danger and we have seen a series of exercises with russians that speaks to this. with its central asian neighbors, china presents themselves as a collaborator and counterterrorism issues both exercises and real-life operations. in south asia china presents a complicated picture particularly in india. it has forces stationed in tibet not in a significant number, but it has improved infrastructure to the point that it can raise an increasing willingness and capability of the pla to deep with the forces and if need be and perhaps most interesting leon china's northeast border with north korea the pla
presents itself as a force that is preparing in my judgment operate unilaterally in the face of the crisis or demise. there is virtually no evidence of any collaboration are in the interaction between the two militaries, certainly no exercise activity that we can see, and this speaks to a pla that is prepared to do risk mitigation and operate on its own but not in a collaboration and that stands in contrast to how it presents itself with other regional borders. going for a couple of interesting things to look for, if and when the pla reforms of military region structure we can expect a force that is more joined in nature and is in a better position to conduct power projection even beyond china's borders using the land force as a component. and perhaps finally we can
easily anticipate along the road to the joint force. a difficult set of bureaucratic in sight he might say as the pla which is the ground force that is 60% in the size and budget of the overall force must necessarily see the increasing pieces of that to the other services and that must be a difficult process to match for the top leadership. >> thank you to ashley and jonathan and the rest of the team it is a great honor to be here today i see some people in the audience to learn from and worked with sorry i don't have time to mention more people and i probably shouldn't because i might get names wrong. i had just flown in from victoria, british columbia having attended a nice sponsored
by the canadian navy and i think i know but now about how they felt they finally made it in 2002. it's been a great journey. i couldn't be excited to be a part of the project. i remember in graduate school what princeton i purchased my tree first strategic asia volume and collection of the subsequent ones and one thing i noticed is that principle and when people move offices or left to go somewhere else the book series would be left in the free book section, but this never, ever happened with strategic asia. before i go further, i have to make the obligatory disclaimer that all of this involves my personal views, of course none of the official policy assessments of the u.s. navy and any other element of the u.s. government but let me highlight
a few other things i attempted to explore in the chapter and that amplify and interviews that gregg was kind to to gather it was a pleasure working with him as well. i think when i try to understand where china's military is what it is and where it is headed, the naval and air force pose a particular challenge because they are diverse. many different types of systems, how to make a larger sense of this collection of systems and people and organizational capabilities. and as i was putting together an order of chapter because i thought it was very important to at least try to have an 80% open source solution on that that than other researchers could build on in the future i felt that it further reinforced patterns that i have been seeing for a long time, namely that
china's developing leaders of capability that i want and how much i would like to use as dropping a stone and water and having it read aloud progressively less intense brings of capability, and i think that related in excellent job of talking about the ground forces and also how central that's been to china in the past decades. and it's really only been in my view as i expressed my chapter since the 1980's china has been able to focus more beyond its immediate homeland into the near see air space above them and i think really the term near sees it is useful because the yellow sea, the east china sea and the south china sea are indeed
contain all of china's remaining unresolved maritime claims as well as the territorial island related claims, thus it is no surprise china is focusing intensely in this area with what i would call the second layer after the court homeland defense capabilities. china is pursuing an approach that is often referred to in chinese sources as counter intervention. perhaps a more specific term would be acted strategic counter attacks on exterior minds. these terms can be interpreted in a way that is more nuanced and the context specific than the antiaccess area denial of the terminology employed by the u.s. military. however, i would argue that these are really essentially two sides of the same claim.
china feels that these areas and their immediate approaches are sensitive and want to be the will to hold the foreign forces of risk to try to dissuade them from entering an unfortunate event of conflict and thereby further more in peace time before then from pursuing the militarily influenced approach to exert leverage in these areas. china is developing a set of weapons systems that are designed to further the set of the purchase but control the physics base limitations, the idea that all people are equal but it tends to be easier to attack missile than defend against a missile. china has been very focused roomettes perspective of its specific operational objectives
quite intelligent in its targeting of these technological developments. but there is a flip side to this, and that is as china seeks to have operational capability, much beyond its own shore, the effectiveness of this approach drops off rapidly for china. i think that you could make a rough argument that because of perhaps the earth's curvature in the parameters of many airborne operations you tend to lose a line of sight buy around 200 nautical miles if not before interestingly coinciding with a potential claim. the result is that there is one area of the near sees for the three seas yearly the southern part of the sea will land-based coverage will not easily get china necessarily the influence that it wants in that critical area. and then of course going much
further beyond into the indian ocean into the third layer or four fleer of capabilities, a very quickly becomes acutely vulnerable to the same types of physics based limitations that it has so attempted to a target in the u.s. foreign platforms. am i chapter was not able to address because of new things happening in china all the time. the second aircraft corporations apparent work on the j31 aircraft prototype also the potential the emergence of the type your defense destroyer and of course the commissioning of the aircraft carrier on the 25th of september. but i still maintain that these developments, however exciting and specific, fit into this larger rubric that i was able to
lay out. looking forward to 2020 and beyond, there are many variables here. it's very difficult to say. researchers at the strategic navy think tank talked about by that time developing a regional blue water defensive and offensive type of navy capable of a variety of different types of missions. i give specifics in the tractor and i wonder if when china's ministry of national defence discuss potential carrier capabilities the free is enhancing production operations capability might not fit into that but there will be many indicators as china seeks to move into the farcies and they will be highly visible. of course, the software is as important if not more than the hardware. organizational training, personal development will determine among other things if with respect to the
sophisticated see for all ksr that is required for both the near c's and farcies missions china will be able to achieve the necessary data fusion or if indeed the data confusion is what results and the jury is out on that one. additional uncertainties can concern in the trajectory of china's economy and demographics i think a straight line projection is extremely unrealistic, and i wonder sometimes if we will look back on the 2010 to 2020 period as china's window of opportunity not just on the international stage but also in terms of domestic factors such as demographics. in conclusion i believe from the u.s. policy perspective and the allied policy perspective it's important to look at china's naval and air force modernization for what i call the lens of distance. i think the implications are
significantly different depending on the area that we examine. for some time to come i think there will be a significant amount of strategic friction and competition although it can be mitigated with a wise policy and i hope a good deal of mutual restraint. further out into the far seas there's a potential for cooperation defense in the global system and the gulf of the counter piracy missions are already an example of that. thank you very much and if anyone is interested in the future of research in doing, many of you may be familiar with my web sites, and >> mark, go ahead. >> thank you very much and i appreciate the opportunity to come and address one of my
favorite topics treated the people's integration army. second artillery force. in my brief remarks here this morning i will talk a bit about missions and drivers in the first modernization may be defining a bit what exactly the second artillery is and then talk about the technical trend and the technology trend and china's expanding capacity for the strike, talkative about the operational trend in terms of infrastructure and doctors and training and end up with a few remarks about the implications for the united states and its interest in peace and stability in the asia-pacific region. to start off with, the second artillery force is china's be vice premier organization that exists to deliver fire power directly to an adversary center
of gravity, take to fight, take firepower deep inside the territory of another country but it is the capitol or whether it is certain critical nodes within an adversary of military force. it's been a reality for quite awhile. the second or tiberi was formed in that team. the 60's was primarily china's nuclear force delivering the nuclear deterrence and the kind of coercion. since the late 1980's and early 90's this expanded and diversified to include the convention. the principal strategic driver or the force driver for the first modernization particularly in the second artillery and arguably the liberation army as a whole is tie one despite all of the attention the south china sea, they remain the strategic direction of a force modernization of remains driver
in other missions the modernization is different by the need to proceed and having a viable deterrent as well as those to counter a perceived conversion with nuclear forces composed. but it's also going to be able to ensure and it's also the force modernization to be able to meet the requirements for what they perceive to be threats for territorial and sovereignty around the periphery whether it is the east china sea or other locations. some of the second artillery force of increasingly accurate and legal ballistic missiles and cruise missiles provide an opportunity to be able to go into for example for the naval
bases as well as to go after the u.s. aircraft carriers and other ships at the sea as they continue to improve the capabilities of the ballistic missiles. it's difficult to stop the diffusion of technology that's going on the global level and the information conditions technology area but able to leverage a lot of the microelectronics to reduce the size of the payloads and increase the accuracy through the guidance systems. in terms of the technical trends, the second artillery is expanding the range of the missile forces on the conventional side from the early 1990's to 91 up until let's say maybe early part of this decade,
they are focused about 600 kilometers with the short-range ballistic missile systems. as time went on, they were able to master some of the critical technologies to enable them to provide the mission to the medium-range ballistic missile forces with 1,500 or 600 kilometers which puts much of japan for the rangers was the south china sea. they go after the moving targets in the sea and generally believe there is an operational capability available to december to three perhaps even today in the province. but beyond extending the range of the ballistic missile forces, as an aside as time goes on, the likelihood of them expanding the range of the firepower with three tells and kilometers it
appears one could anticipate. also the diversified delivery platforms the wonder just ballistic missiles but also ran a cruise missiles which light missiles are very difficult to intercept and stop and flight. also, integrating and increasingly complex measures make it much more difficult to intercept the missiles in certain stages of the flight with his midcourse or terminal phase through the on board and other technologies advances reducing the cross section vehicles which pose a sycophant challenge to missile defenses with payloads particularly whether this creating the munitions and deepen the targets perhaps more exotic sorts of
fire power like not nuclear but the my career for other sorts of payloads that as time goes on they are able to master some of the technologies that could cause difficulties for the electronic systems in u.s. and other facilities around the world so the operational trends the second artillery of regional infrastructure has grown from say a 15 brigade, there is the sort of basic unit within the second artillery and missile units so 15 brigades in 1994 up to a place 28 brigades to become 28, 29, 30 doubled in size. the bulk of the expansion of a particular corner of the organization that's truly dedicated toward the thai one scenario with expanding units out more towards that western part of china which could be available for south china rather
than the contingency against iran and india and others. but the greater mobility of the logistics capabilities in complex training especially by the joint training with the air force with the navy and others include interchangeable nuclear and conventional warheads. exactly what units are capable the brigades are capable of having interchangeable conventional warheads it's not clear and the only data point is that in 2009 when they interviewed the ballistic missile as being dole nuclear and conventional cable. so with that in mind of the operational trends there are implications for u.s. interest. in general with these types of ballistic missile capabilities of increasingly accurate, meaningless a roughly a target on land for example and an air
base or command control facility being able to hit within let's say at least 30 meters. but it has the potential to be able to get least complicate the u.s. ability to operate the region. in taiwan of course it provides -- eight presents a significant challenge for taiwan for example to be able to deny the pla air superiority when faced with ballistic missiles that have damaged runways for example. doesn't mean that taiwan should have an air force to operate from their fields when we have that type of system threat of having the ballistic missiles come in and damaging the runways. another challenge that is if the trends continue in terms of developing the force for accuracy and without buddy and
extent of ranges than one should not dismiss the possibility of the next ten to 15 years of having a sort of mirror program to the global strike in terms of being able to deliver the emissions out to be icbm intercontinental range as. those being able to strike within the continental united states with conventional munitions and targets that could come if affected, they could detract from the u.s. ability and conduct operations around the world. so another challenge, not definite, just things to watch over the next ten to 15 years. then finally one of the implications of china pla's reliance upon the contingent strike assets particularly the ballistic missiles is that it it could prompt other militaries in the region to develop the similar to devotees. the most efficient and effective way of defending against the missiles is to be able to interdict the structure on the
ground and it's natural that the countries around the region whether it is taiwan are japan, india and others could be developing similar capabilities. finally i want to bear in mind of the expansion of the second artillery took place at the time right in the wake of the negotiation between the intermediate nuclear forces agreement or the idf treaty between the united states and the soviet union so they rely upon the ballistic missiles as a central part of their war fighting capability that took place in the vacuum created by the treaty and that is the last potential implication is that it could prompt for example moscow or in the future even romney or obama or beyond that administration to be able to rethink the commitments without the rest of the world. with that, turn it over to you. >> thank you, travis. i'm here to talk about
information warfare. information warfare is important because it crosscuts all the different campaigns that we've been talking about. the land, air and sea in the missile campaign. the chinese it's also important because they view information and the ability to use information and the ability to deny information as the primary or the foundational criteria for whether you win or lose on the battlefield. but before i get to much into the information more for let me talk about the pla concept operations to inform the warfare. the chinese are looking to fight a war that has been called a quick war what resolution. they have looked at let's say the falkland islands and the 1991 operation desert storm and they have come to determine that battles are fought with just one campaign. it's not like world war ii were the of the north africa campaign
and then in northern europe campaign, and because the modern battles are fought in just one campaign it is imperative you seize the initiative at the beginning of the battle because you won't have a second chance to go ahead and try to counter attack against your enemy. this is especially important when you face a strong opponent like the u.s. military because the chinese have learned from their history if you let the u.s. military get locked and loaded on your border it's too late and we will steamroll over you. so you've got to do something before the u.s. can build up its forces. consequently what you see, what is prevalent in the chinese military writing is the concept of gaining mastery by striking first which encompasses a lot of things both for our discussion here things like the engine and surprise attacks because what you see is that recognition that you can't let a superior force get built up too much. you have to strike them early
perhaps even an adult stage 1 of the enemy is unprepared. how does this relate to information warfare? what kind of targets is china talking about when they are wanting to conduct these first strikes? they're looking at things the call vital targets otherwise known as centers of gravity. and these are targets that could have an overall impact on the situation on the overall belfield situation. attacking vital targets is especially recommended in cases where the pla faces a powerful enemy equipped with high-technology weapons and equipment. read the u.s. military. they also say the vital targets are those involved in collecting and processing of the is our systems are these vital targets. these are the ones the need to strike first. consequently, information superiority is now seen as the main determinant of success on the battlefield, and indeed the
pla is tasked with running the local war under the conditions of information as asian. so, the pla is now charged with seizing information superior rate on a defined as the ability to freely use information and to deny the use of information to your opponent, and this is important because what they view now is the ability to speed with which the military is able to make decisions is the traditional factor and why the military is successful on the battleground and there's two ways you can prove this, and of your own decision making ability speed through the better system and the other is that you can deny those of devotees to your opponent. and we actually see that happening now both in the chinese doctrine and the technology. however, information superiority does not have to be achieved through out all battlefields for all time. you see the writing that they are saying that information
superiority can be achieved locally and in a certain place as well as in a certain time to read what you're seeing here is what you're talking about in a striking specific node that opens up a window of robert kennedy that the follow-on forces can explore to a decisive advantage in the battle. the goal here is to penalize, not to annihilate the enemy. they are not out to destroy every fighter plane or sink every shift. they are here to make the enemy deaf and dumb and blind, to cut the conditions devotee on ksr. and of course, space, cyber and electronic warfare are all subsets of information warfare. so let me talk about space first. just about every book or journal article you read on fair begins with the line whoever controls space controls the earth. why do they say this? they say this because they're looking at the way that the u.s.
military fought the war and its reliance on space. chinese authors state the u.s. depends for 80% of its common additions on communications satellites and it depends 80 to 90% of its intelligence on the space-based on ksr. they see the benefit of the u.s. military has derived from space and as they are thinking about going further from the shore into the south china sea they see how it can play a vital part in improving their operations and their power projection capabilities. however when they see the u.s. military relies on space they also view it as an achilles' heel, something you can strike and achieve great effect therefore that is when you see when we see the 2007 test for it launched a direct calfee hinkle to detroit and it could destroy one of the weather satellites. second, let me talk about cyber. cyber is the most pernicious
threat. it seems not a week goes by that we don't hear of some military government or commercial organization getting hacked into by the chinese. the chinese view the cyber warfare hacking into computers and computer warfare as central to information warfare because computers are ubiquitous. they are everywhere and central to all of the information systems. for the chinese, cyber has pretty good advantages first of all this low-cost it's not as expensive as an aircraft or fighter plane and it has rapid effect the virus can spread throughout the information system very quickly. it can be covert. you can't -- it is difficult to attribute an attack to any one individual or group and also the chinese writers often state that cyberattack can possess the same destructive ability as the nuclear weapons. finally, cyber allows china and power projection capability is
where they lack of first and they can reach out and touch that at bursar him across the ocean where they can't do that with the other weapon systems. what kind of targets are they talking about? they're talking about all sorts of command and control targets, ray resistance they also talk about the hidden civilian targets such as power stations, financial centers and transportation. and of course the final element here evin formation electronic warfare. china is very interested in jamming a communications and radar signals was using radar signals and we have seen here as in space and cyber an increase in their capabilities in these areas. over the long term any potential adversary of china must be prepared for strong strikes against the sea for on ksr
systems at the beginning of a campaign or even before when that adversary is building up its forces were preparing for the campaign. this is especially important for the u.s. military because as i've stated before, the chinese military knows you can't let the u.s. military get built up and get ready to strike because we are too powerful. ..
>> we rely right now in many areas on a few highly valuable, but low number of systems that are very capable. what do we do if we lose those systems in a war? >> consequently how to conduct information warfare in an age of budget austerity is essential to the question how we respond to chinese modernization. thank you. >> thank you, kevin. thank you to the panels for the terrific presentations. we appreciate that very much. we'll have a few minutes for questions from the floor. state your name and affiliation when you ask your question, and that'd be great. thanks. >> thanks so much, chris nelson,
wonderful discussions. i had a broad question and a specific one to roy on north korea, fascinating your point that pla is preparing for unilateral intervention in a collapsed scenario. could you fill that out more? is there any sense of -- are we talking border control or heading straight for pyongyang? any sense of their awareness of the need to talk to us about it, if not coordinate? you know, what are we going to do, guys, if the place falls apart? we don't want to fight each other again, do we? that's the question to roy. the broader question, and i would have asked this of the secretary. as we describe what we have to do because of what they're going to do and what all our friends and allies are doing, we are describing an enormous arms race, aren't we? building in response, counterresponse, ect., and yet we have the budget thing. how do we -- is it naive to
think in terms of can we somehow deal with all of this without a built in arms race with all of that implied? thank you. >> go ahead. >> i actually thought christian might ask that question. i flush is out in the chapter, important to hear what i'm not saying as well as what i am saying. the evidence in my view supports the judgment that the pla's prepared to operate unilaterally. we have little evidence of cooperation between the forces of the military region and the green people's army. there could be stuff in the class fied domain, but in the open source, precious little evidence of that. second, we see at senior levels, and that is largely of a political czar nature suggesting that that is an element of the relationship that's perhaps more
important to the two parties. third, the evidence that we have from exercises is very limited, and non-existent when it comes to forces operating together, and i guess, finally, the pattern of behavior we've seen in the past whether accurately reported by media is of unilateral steps taken by the chinese border security forces or military. that is, those occasions in the past when we've seen that the border has been quote-on-quote "closed," and we have to be prepared to understand the sourcing for that is usually limited to those who want to have a particular judgment or message, but it also is very limited in what it's completely uncollaboratetive. my conclusion is the pla is preparing to operate unilaterally. beyond that, it's highly speculative. i talked about the potential ways they might think about it, but you have a range of possibilities from -- on one
extreme, moving forces into north korea and essentially setting up a buffer zone to a very kind of more limited option to defend chinese sovereignty at the border itself. third part of the question is are we talking? we, hopefully are, but there's not much evidence about that, and you know, the concern from the chinese per perspective is t leaks, it appears they've already moved on to an end game which then destalizes their partner, and it's in their interest for their partner not to be destabilized in north korea, but a grave concern i think we ought to be worried about is in the case of sudden collapse or sudden scenario, if you will, there's strategic sites within north korea it's in the interest of china, the united states, and south korea,
each to secure the areas they pursue those securing missions in an uncoordinated fashion. that's pretty concerning. >> take a question from our audience members in the overflow area, and asked the authors to respond. two quick responses. from is from marcy in the defense department. what extent will base keeping negotiations impact development in the future? >> i don't think is has a huge impact on modernization, but an impact on the degree to which china is accepted, particularly the ground forces are accepted in an international setting, but i don't see it as a driver for mod earnization except in the -- modernization except in the supporting of the logistical and other types of dimensions that would enable forces to deploy.
>> did you want to comment on naval forces at all? respond to the peace keeping operations? >> i certainly think the pla navy is learning a lot in the gulf of aiden, and i think it's making a positive contribution. this is an example of how china can receive more recognition in the intergnarl -- international system in the contributions it makes, but i think the pla navy and civilian leadership is very focus focused on china's specific strategic goals, and i don't think it gets diverted from that. an area to watch is the extent to which china's navy and air force as well will move into the direction of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. there's sometimes some positive murmurings, i think, from chinese policymakers, but i have yet to see the proof that the services are interested in
really focusing on that. we will -- we will see, but, again, i agree with roy, i don't see a huge impact here, certainly no distraction from the areas of central focus. >> great, thank you very much. we're going to break right now for a short coffee break. those of you who want to refill your coffee, please do so. i'll ask you promptly return. we'll start the second panel on regional and u.s. responses right at 11:05 sharp. join me in thanking the panelists. thank you very much. it was a great presentation. [applause] [inaudible conversations] >> i'm staple phon roy, directer of the kissinger institute here
in the united states in the woodrow wilson sender. this is the second pam of the morning, and the first dealt with chinese military capabilities, and this looks at the asian response to china's growing military capabilities. we have two outstanding panelists. i'm not going to run through the bios in the interest of saving time, but the bios are in the program sheet that i think most or all of you have. we'll lead off with ashley and then move to dan blommenthal. ashley? >> thank you. it's a blessing to be here this morning. thank you for coming. i have the very pleasurable, but challenging task because i have to summarize today the totality of asian responses to the developments described in some detail in the first panel. if i can do that, that's will be some sort of minor miracle and
more mir rack -- miraculous because the chapters were not written by me, but three of my collaborators who for various reasons, because they are in not in the united states, could not be with us today. i'll take the best stab i can at trying to summarize how the asian region, particularly the strategic asian quadrants, everything from northeast asia to north asia. the key states along this belt have been responding to the kinds of kate increases that were described at some length and the great clarity in the first panel. the chapters that focus on this in the book constitute literally half the book. because they deal with
extraordinary levels of detail and extraordinary levels of nuance, i urge you at some point to read the chapters themselves, and whatever i do this morning will be really an incomplete summary because there are real differences of nuance given the diversity of the countries involved. there is a chapter that looks at northeast asia, that in some detail, examines japan's response, south korea's response, and taiwan's response, and as you might imagine, there's considerable difference in, for example, the way japan thinks about the rise of the military power and now south korea ya does with taiwan in between. there's a chapter looking at indonesia, vietnam, and australia in some details while also talking about the continental southeast asian states. there is a single chapter on india which focuses on the south
asian region which, again, has a very unique perspective about china's rise. what i'm not doing this morning in the interest of my own sanity and dplandz of brevity is to give you the details of each of the responses. rather, what i want to do is pull together some teams that i think unify all the chapters with respect to asia. what are the unifying themes? i'll start with the first one. none of the chapter authors has concluded that any of the asian states that were reviewed in the volume welcomes china's increases in military capacity. i thought that was interesting insight that there are various degrees of ang nigh -- anxiety, sometimes even fear, but you do not find from the
states any sense that china's increased military capacity is necessarily a good thing for them. that, i think, is a very useful backdrop to keep in mind because it's speaking to some of the themes that was flagged earlier in the morning. the persistence of historic animosities, the continuation of great power rivalries in the region, and, of course, the importance of the united states as somehow providing a degree of deliberation which brings order to an otherwise rather anxious environment. the second big point i want to make -- okay, so the first point is that the region exhibits a variety of responses from fear on one end, and little sense, if any, that china's modernization and capacity are good for the asian pacific. that's point one.
point number two, having said what i just said, there is still a provasive sense throughout the region that china's economic rise is a good thing. it's, of course, good for china, but it's very important for the success of china's neighbors as well. each of the neighboring states, and i use neighboring in the broadest sense of the word here, wants to maintain as strong economic ties with this rising power as it possible even as each appears to have various degrees of anxiety about how china's growing military capabilities might impact on the dynamic of their bilateral relationships. in the strict sense there is a little schizophrenia. there is a degree of welcome. there is a degree of resentivity and a claim of achievements.
there is a desire to participate in china's economic growth and in the benefits of china's economic growth even as this intense desire for participation is corroded by the anxieties that appear to be in the peripheral vision of each of the actors, and the anxieties, of course, are rooted in the recognition that there are, even as we continue to do the research, ongoing changes in the local balance the power, changes that seem to unsettle china's neighbors. this concern that the local balance the power is changing is manifested in two forms, and almost every chapter reflects this. the balance of power is changing
in se met try call ways and a- symmetrical ways. there's the air and naval projections, and because they are changing, and because of the very nature of the capabilities they have and vice president reached, even countries not located immediately adjacent to china see a potential challenge that must be addressed because changing chinese capabilities in these war fighting arenas. these are complemented by changeses taking place in the arena of the a-symmetric conflict. i don't see it as being distinct apologies of conflict, but more of a spectrum, by all the same,
it's a useful artifact because it conveys a certain form of how power manifests itself. on the a-symmetric side, there's a great deal of concern about china's growing missile capabilities, and the ability to reach at distance the point that mark made, you know, with great clarity in the first presentation. it's also complemented by concerns of china's growing ability to shape outcomes with respect to information space and electronic warfare. again, the concerns here are because china, these war fighting technologies allow china to reach a great distance from its frontier. there are two broad consequences that follow from these changes both in the symmetric world and the a-symmetric world. there's changes in the local,
bilateral balances of the power, particularly among countries that for 30-40 years end joyed advantages relative to china. if you think of countries like japan, countries like india, countries like australia, that until very recently, they were in a sense masters of their own security domains, they now begin to sense growing chinese power as in a sense upsetting the world they were very familiar with. there is a second set of consequences that states are also beginning to be uncomfortable about, and that is china's increasing ability to impede the part of the united states, particularly in the specific and in the pacific, and because of the fear that if the united states were to intervene in the areas, it would shape the balance to china's disadvantage. two sets of fear here. there's a regional fear about
the bilateral, that is the balance basically shifting to the disadvantage of the individual countries, and then there's a fear that the great protecter, the united states, whose presence in the asia pacific region was in a sense taken for granted and unchallenged for many, many decades, and now those capabilities are at risk, and so the consequences of what that means for the security of each of the individual states, obviously, begins to be an issue. let me end quickly by saying something about how these nations are responding. in almost every case, if you take the descriptions in the chapters at face value, you find that the regional responses are extremely complex, extremely subtle, and quite multifaceted, that it does not permit what i think are straight line expectations of high intensity arms races. pree sicely, because of the --
precisely because of the background of economic interdependence. when you look at the regional responses, even in the part of the countries that are directly effected by modernizations, like the asian great powers, japan, india, and australia, you see a great deal of subtlety in how they respond. i could identify four broad themes that appear in each of the chapters. first, each of the countries concerned, even as they are worried about china's military trajectory implicated deep economic engagement. no one wants to begin a competition with china, which in a sense kills the goose that laid the golden egg. deep in economic engage. second, a great institution amendment making certain that china is party to all kinds of regional and sewings -- institutional arrangements that they will somehow limit
proclivity to do unhelpful things because of the equities its invested in institutions. third, an emphasis, even as they focus on economics and institutions, on a variety of unilateral discussions that are focused all the way from soft to the hardest forms of balancing, and this, again, can include everything from revving up their own economic performance in order to cope with china's changes all the way to building up their own military capacity. each of the chapters describes the dynamic in extraordinary detail. last, and very interestingly, almost uniformly, a deepened reliance on the united states. great expectations that american power continues to survive. in other words, the united states would make all the right decisions with respect to protecting its own power and political capabilities so as to
aid regional states in the difficult circumstances that they find themselves in, and the difficult circumstances being how do you keep the benefits of economic interdependence without being vulnerable to the changes in chie nays strength? the u.s. now becomes, in many ways, the culver bullet for many of the asian states because the degree to the u.s. can play its traditional great powers protecter role without imperilment to that degree, the tensions and challenges facing the asian states are mitigated. it's a very complicated set of chapters i commend to you for your reading at leisure. thank you. >> thank you, ashley. we are now going to move from one panelist to another and from one moderator to another. i, unfortunatelily, have to leave to meet bob kissinger who
is arriving to the wilson center, but will from npr will take over for me. dan, over to you. >> well, thank you. i'd like to thank the woodrow wilson center and asian research as well as ashley, himself, who is certainly driving the process intellectually and a role model in bringing strategic studies and deep knowledge of asia together, which i think is part of what we are trying to do here. i thank laura, who is in the audience, not just a research assistant, but almost a partner in the endeavor. we think the chinese are nontransparent about defense spending, and they are. try looking at u.s. defense budgets and going through the various presidential statements, omb statements, naval shipbuilding staples, and we may
be too transparent. certainly confused us. we tried to bring logic to it in the end as was our task. i'd like to go through five points, if i might. the first, i think, has to do with -- i'm putting the cards on the table, a traditionalist in strategic matters in the sense that political goals drive strategy and military capabilities. i examined to some extent the competing goals of china and the region. the united states has -- and the other way i'm a traditionalist is looking at military history and military campaigns to try to give at least some baseline to think about the various scenarios we talk about here because a lot can as you heard from the other panel, capabilities can, again, sound very new, but i think some of
the strategic principles remain the same, and i'll get into that a little bit later, but i think we have to start with the fact that presidents, since the end of world war ii or even as world war ii was ending, have chosen and stuck to a form of a strategy for the united states and asia, and that strategy has been privacy. there's other strategies available. you can have an offshore strategy. you can have a selective engagement strategy. you can try to build a concert. we may say it in nicer terms, but the strategy has been privacy. that strategy has been meant to further the goals of great power of peace, which, by the way, has succeeded quite well over the last 30 years in asia, and i think quite unexpectedly, and secondly, the forward defense of the united states homeland on specific approaches was which in
the minds of planners after world war ii, and thirdfuls trying to mitigate security competitions as ashley explained, particularly competition in weapons of mass destruction. that's been mentioned, especially the great powers in the chapters, each one could have, but didn't, acquire nuclear weapons. that might change, but i think that's a pretty successful nonproliferation policy. finally, something that's been the writ, i think, of american doctrine since we got involved in asia, even before the 20th century, was preventing the rise of a hostile hedge who could dominate asia, and therefore, essentially dominate the world and cause problems for us. now, the underlying military strategy for privacy was articulated best by mit, who is
ironic because he's against u.s. privacy, but articulated in a great amount of detail what under guards u.s. privacy, and that's something called command of the commons, and i think that's accurate. it's not access to the commons, which is a polite way of saying things, access to domains, but the fact that the u.s. has been able to command the commons, and i keep cyber out of here because i don't think we understand how you can -- if you can at all -- command cyber, but the domains of air, sea, and space and using, commands of the commons, the analog is paul kennedy's naval mastery, but it's something more. you can essentially get vastly more use of it than others, and credibly deny that to others. that makes possible all the kinds of things we've done in asia to keep the peace or, in some cases, engage in war over the course of the 70 years.
that's what's coming under threat more than anything else from china. command of the commons means that you can, as we've done in the persian gulf, use power against a force like in the case of the persian gulf, iraq, before it brings power to bear, and power can't be used, and you can project power as we've done in the asian pacific to quiet the taiwan straits crisis to prevent acue in the philippines and to engage in the tanker wars in the indian ocean. it means you don't have to have all your power resident. there's a huge infrastructure of command to deploy forces any time, anywhere, without much resistance. command of the commons has been
key to navalling our on thives in asia. also key, i think, to providing the extent of the nuclear deterrent, and this is missed, we have not had to place any nuclear weapons inside of asia. they just, as james has said and written, a former secretary of defense, they are in use every day by the united states through our patrolling with the ability to do that which encourages some and detours others. china's strategy has been described in detail by the other panel. i won't get too much into that, but a big part of it is to rest away control, at least from parts of the commons, and create contested zones in the near seas using their own precision strike complex, which includes the ballistic missiles, most prom innocently that mark stokes talked about, but also
submarines and very robust capabilities, and, now, contesting the zone in closer to china's shores allows it to -- china to do traditional military activities. here's where i'm a traditionalist. they write about this, but it's about regional control of the air and the seas so air control, sea control in a conflict, at least over the taiwan strait and perhaps over japan as well. command of the -- it's a arrest and control of creating some of the contested zones inside the larger umbrella of the commons, and that allows you to engage in conflict while the united states is fighting back to regain comopped of the commons and bring us full power to bear should it want to do so. i use, and a couple analogies k again, as i said, i looked to
military history, of how china would be able to accomplish some of the goals. i look to both imperial japanese strategy, which no analogy is perfect, obviously, china is a continental country with nuclear power and a lot of strategic depths, but in order to defeat the united states at the end of the day in the conflict, china -- there's certain elements of imperial strategy that may prove attractive, or at least what the japanese thought they wanted to do, which was strike very hard, very quickly using surprise and deception at the front line forces of the united states, and then create layers of in-depth defense afterwards and sort of not taunt, but dare the united states to enter those zones afterwards. then, of course, the soviet maritime, the horizontal escalation that the soviets were talking about, which is why this con cement of anti-access and
air denial is not new. the soviets engaged in that as well, setting up perimeters. the purpose was not to engauge us in a maritime competition, but to keep us from attacking the continental soviet union if they conventionally attacked the united states. the center of gravity was the continent, the maritime perimeters were an anti-access strategy at the time so we couldn't bring force to bear against the soviets. i see some analogies in terms of the different points, the near seas, far seas, and so much about and soviet maritime strategy. the third point is how has u.s. responded? well, the pivot in the rebalancing as heard earlier has a lot of elements to it. some of which are diplomatic, some of which are negotiating access points, and some of which have trade elements to it so forth and so on, but i think one
thing that happened that at least when i was going through my research is that the pivot or rebalance, the more public comments about what air-sea battle concept means and the guidance all got shoved into one, and so when you are looking -- when one is looking at military manifestations of the strategic balance, you're looking at a lot of what the air-sea battle folks have said. i think that we're -- my fourth point would be, air-sea battle has an operational concept without a strategy which maybe that's what it's supposed to be. a lot of people look at it as a strategy, but it doesn't answer basic questions such as, well, if one of the -- if one of the lines of attack in air sea battle is to attack the chinese in-depth, well, it's a nuclear armed country. it doesn't really answer that
question. the second is, i certainly, if i was a chinese planner and saw the united states talking about attacking me in depth, i would look at the nuclear policy quite a bit, and i think mark mentioned that as well. it doesn't answer the question of what happens at the end. i mean, what -- how do -- if we have a strategy of privacy, at the end of the conflict, end of a competition, what do we want to say to our adversaries and where do we want to be at the end of all of that? there are -- there's deficiencies in the operational concept and deficiencies in the balancing. what stands out the most are just the numbers. the numbers just do not add up. i feel for my friend at the department of defense who are trying their best in the scenario to make it credible, but every capability that seems to be relevant for pacific se
scenarios are being cut. there was an initial cut of $300 billion under secretary gates for efficiencies. there was a next round of cutting that ash carter mentioned, $487 billion, before sequestering, and it's starting to hurt. the other problem or the other issue is just as, and i take everyone at their word end acting strategic rebalancing, but it's hard to decide to pull out of a region if the region is not cooperating with you. the middle east doesn't seem to be cooperating. it is blowing up. we fought a war in libya, and we, you know, we may have to say we were not so involved, but there were -- by mying -- account, targets done by the united states, and i don't see how you pull out all the capability just willie nilly
from the middle east with iran, syria, and so on and so forth and put that ability on the asian pacific. if you could, it still doesn't add up. i'll go through a few numbers before i get to the final point. over the next five years, defense spending will actually -- without sequesterathion, will decrease by .3%, and that particularly hits in the procurement budget and acquisition budge. shipbuilding is one of the least steady programs we have today. as recently as 2012, the navy in front of the house armed services committee said ideally 500 ships of all kinds is what we need worldwide. somebody got to them, and they gave them a hostage response and said, actually, we met 300, but what i tried to do was look at the current defense program put
out in 2013 revising the gate's numbers from 20 # 12 and say where are we going to be in 2017. if trends continue, it's 285 ships. 285 ships, the lowest since world war i. the attacks on the program, the one program, everybody, i think, agrees is one of the most important programs for the united states and asia is under a lot of stress. ash carter mentioned the virginia class submarine that's been -- the buy is postponed, and just given the fiscal uncertainties of the last few years, i don't think anyone can feel confident that it won't be revised downward again. the shipbuilding took a huge hit. the joint strike fighter, the f-35, the only stealthy, besides the f-22 #, stealthy aircraft we have. we don't have a bomber yet. revised downward in the five
year from from 335 to 244 total. it's not as if the chie nays are revising their numbers down. they have the ballistic missile force, and mark talked about, it but between 390 and 600 advanced aircraft just in the taiwan strait region itself. they are preparing for an air fight. they are air-to-air fight. the bomber will not do it itself. these numbers matter quite a bit. ammunitions, missile defense, admiral willard and secretary and others have been mentioning capabilities they want. they have been careful about it, of course, because it's not their role to question civilians, but they mentioned missile defense, f-35s, and the ability of the global hawks and the bam system talked about to operate together. global hawk is going away totally in terms of new purchases. missile defense is taking a
serious cut. again, i'm going to -- the long range bomber, something we've talked about in the defense community since 1999. ten years later, we have funding for it about $6 billion or so for an airplane that's going to cost upwards of ten times that much, if not more. by 2017, we'll have a paper study of a bomber, and maybe a down select competition of this component or capability that people need for asian pacific. we're at the lowest amount of bombers since the cold war, 135. i'll give you some idea of how we have done business in the past, and desert storm, against iraq, a very unformidable foe,
unlike china, used 115 ships of all kinds in desert storm to clear mines, to carry aircraft, and the rest of it. there was four marine expedition their strike routes, just that's the way we do business. these are going away. the average theater campaign for the united states has been about 30,000 targets, and china, it's just orders of magnitude higher to be credible, and it's not adding up. let me finish with a couple points. one, i think, i have charts about how the numbers go down and how we fought wars in the past, and how it just doesn't seem to be credible right now, just in terms of the numbers stand point. the last point to leave you with is a lost art of the nuclear
deterrents. i don't think it's credible to talk about capabilities in the asia pacific anymore without talking about the conventional nuclear mix. it is a nuclear power, and when we talk about conventional strike, and they talk about conventional strike, you know, somebody's eventually going to get pissed off if they are hit badly. i think this is an area of deeply needed research which is what exactly is in flux, what exactly is china's nuclear policy today, and given some of the things coming out, what kind of capability do they have, and what kind of capability do we need to end control. i'll end there. >> thank you so much. actually, thank you for the insightful summaries of the rest of asia and america's response
to china's rising military strength, and we have a few minutes now for discussion. i'd like to open the floor, again, to questions, and we've a roaming microphone if you is a question. the gentleman here in the center, towards the back. >> thanks for the comments. mike miller, national defense from the air force, a question for dan regarding air, sea battle here. understand concerns with air-sea battle as it applies to its implementation of mainland china; however, a lot of the strategy now revolves around coming to the aide of a bilateral or multilateral partner in the region. say, i go to the defense of one of those partners, say australia or whoever you want to call it, where you impose that tyranny of distance against china, how do
you see our military capabilities in response in that scenario opposed to, you know, mainland china? >> i'm glad you actually call china out because, obviously, it is about china. i think the tough thing for nip to do would have to be much more brilliant as i than a statesman to reassure the region it is about china and china that it's not about them. [laughter] i don't know how that is going to be done. look, i -- i have good friends in the air force and navy who i commend for the effort. i'm not saying it's not a great effort. it's -- it is an operational -- it's putting the operational cart before the strategic horse. that's not the fault of the people in uniform. they are in some ways -- trying to be generous here. they are trying to figure out an answer to the problem before others come to struggle with
that problem. air-sea battle answers some of the china questions, certainly being able to operate in the contested zone, if not to be able to rest back parts of -- parts of the commons. when it comes to allies, that's very interesting because i think it's now imperative, i mean, just as someone who travels to the region like many other people here quite a bit, to explain to allies or have a discussion with allies about what capabilities and fore structures we think they should be looking at as we form this kind of -- these capabilities. we are going forward, obviously, with the air-sea battle operational concepts. i think that would be a key ingredient in making the strategic rebalance look sustainable, and i don't have a good sense, and, of course, i'm not in government, that key allies have a sense of how they are supposed to posture. >> another question?
ed -- admiral levine? >> dan, do you think that's a danger that the chinese conclude they achieved a capability to detour us from effective and timely intervention, and therefore, be embolden to consider military option much more readily than they might otherwise? >> yes, i think there's a danger. i think, in particular, if the chinese -- let's not just pick on china, but the north koreans are able to think that they can use conventional or other means as mark talked about in terms of a prompt global strike capability to decouple us, and, you know, this really -- and, again, strategic principles being the same, this is what nato feared when the soviets were able to strike the u.s.
homeland. you know, if the chinese get to the point of having a credible conventional strike capability, and that's what the north koreans go for too, but, you know, we'll see, then i think there's a real danger that it becomes this age old question of will the united states risk its own soil to come to the defense of an ally or even in the case of taiwan, a non-ally, obligated under certain conditions on the tra, and i think that given -- if i was chinese, i would want the capability to decouple. i think mark made a strong case of the kinds of capabilities that they are looking to in terms of hitting the homeland. guam is no longer a sanctuary. we'll see if the rest of the u.s. homeland is over the next ten years.
>> great. we have a question from the audience members in the overflow auditorium. dan, you get a break. this is for you, ashley from rose chen. she says u.s. past dealings with asia have not been successful like the loss of china, korean war, vietnam just to mention a few. what have we learned? how can we be sure we're not making a similar mistake in the dealings with china as a potential enemy? >> two appointments. the united states has lost many battles during the cold war, but it won the cold war. it won -- >> microphone, please. >> sorry. >> thank you. i couldn't hear you. >> it won the cold war, but two very important consequences. it preserved an asian order that was extremely hose pit m to the
-- hospitable to the rise of economic independence and rise of prosperity, but it's the benefits of the order that the asian states are enjoying today, which has been a singular product of the united states' ability to guarantee the security of the system no matter how many individual engagements it lost along the way. the second thing american success did was dampen security competition among the asian states. we see the residues of that security competition to this day. our own allies have them, and others could get worse if the political and military capabilities of the united states begin to diminish to the point where those order producing functions, in a sense, can want be sustained.
when i look at the last 70 years, i'm happy to admit there have been plenty of reversals, not just in the battlefield, but even in the way we conducted our political engagements. the net outcomes have been singularly positive, not simply for the region, but for the united states as well. the challenge where it comes to china really is going to be one we have to con front, but whose conclusion is not yet written. what is that challenge? you have a rising power like china, which profited essentially from being embedded in the american order, but it has own ambitions and interest. to the degree that it seeks to pursue and achieve those ambitions and interests by force, i think to that degree you get a collision, and there will be risks to the order that
ashcot and others are trying to protect. to the degree that china begins to see it by working cooperatively within the confines of an order that fundamentally serves the interest. how do we make this work and practice? that's the business of day-to-day diplomacy, and that's going to be dependent on the achievements of many others in the city and not just like ourselves. >> mark, do you want to pose the last question? >> just a quick one. something not addressed in the comments by deputy secretary carter, and it's rarely mentioned, but taiwan, under its existing republic china constitution, is an independent sorch state, the absent of
relations does not sub tract from the reality. with this in mine, there's sensitivities with beijing. i'm curious, what potential role could taiwan play in u.s. rebalancing in asia? what are we missing now, and what could be done more in leveraging with what taiwan has to offer with the united states and its interests? >> this is a trap. [laughter] he knows the answer to the question. [laughter] i will fall into it anyway. [laughter] my own view, and this is a whole, you know, i think other conversation about building fore structure and capacity in asia pacific is that the states that are a bit weaker than china can pull a page out of china and develop their own anti-access scenario and denial capabilities and make it woefully painful for china to project power into their countries or into their
maritime zones, and you can go from diesel electric submarines to mine laying to counter capabilities, and, you know, and i think this is true in taiwan which is quite a capable relative military to some of the other countries we're trying to build capacity in like the fill fifteens and indonesia, but -- philippines and indonesia, but each one of them could build contested zones by which chinese power can't come, and if it does, it would be simply a bloody affair. >> i think if i may just add to what dan just said, the united states can choose to use a range of partners, both former allies and non-former allies, to build in exactly that direction, but it would require us to make strategic decisions on a range of things all the way from, say, technology cooperation and the
release of certain capabilities all the way to intelligent sharing about what is happening all the way to putting in place and submitting patterns of cooperation. i think we would have to move in that direction very smartly, and if what secretary said this morning is taken at face value, the department is obviously struggling with the best way to do that, but i think it has to be a concerted effort and involve other countries. >> i think, and i'll lev you all with -- leave you all with this idea. ashley is exactly right. a regional con consortium is ana whose time has come that people can buy into parts of and everyone can at least see -- everyone can at least see the same picture. all allies can see the same picture of what's going on in their seas and their air. great topic for the next institution. thank you, both. i appreciate it very much.
to conclude, i want to thank dan ashley, the others with us here today, those who couldn't be here as well for their contributions to have year's asia volume, ad i want to thank the audience members here with us that joined us today for the great questions that you posed, and i'll ask you to join me in thanking all the panelists and for the great presentations they've made. [applause] >> another view on china now from former secretary of state, henry kissinger. he gave his assessment and historical perspective on changing in the country at an event hosted by the woodrow wilson center. his remarks are about 20 minutes. >> my experience in china is a person of experience who somebody, by accident, was assigned to conduct the first
mission to china. largely, because president nixon felt if he went through regular channels, he'd be overwhelmed with a lot of technical details on subjects he considered not central to the immediate challenge, and he could be sure i couldn't overwhelm him with details. [laughter] when i first came to china, i had an experience which is, perhaps unique in this sense -- every visitor to china would have killed for the privilege of meeting chairman mao. i was terrified of having to do it for the reason that i knew that president nixon wanted to
be the first policymaker who met him. ..
each generation of chinese leader. and each of that reflected the mission and the conditions of experience. now is revolutionary, a prophet consumed by the object is here that recognize no obstacles in terms of eligibility. the standard literalistic language of american diplomacy, he brought me to ina in his mind is that china had to find a possibility of having the
barbarians, the more distant barbarians. in other words, how the united states balance the soviet union. that was his strategic objective . the people with great strategic skills. i had the good fortune that my opposite number who was prime minister for decades and was to serve for the first until he was forced out of office for years after the opening.
also because of the revolutionary generation. they directly accept it. and when president ford said to him, i always believed -- i always say when you disagree, you don't have to be disagreeable, but it makes no sense in cheney's. i said by which you always say that? [laughter] the most skillful diplomat that
i encountered was a matter of extraordinary ability into at, intangibles of the situation and of course he was involved in many of the actions involved an enormous human suffering. and those that i asked. it's personally. when we first started talking to the chinese, we had one great advantage. we were only important top picks to talk about. there were no trivial topics on the table. there is nothing that needed to
be settled. there is no trade even five years after the opening, the trade with china was less than the trade with some curious. about three, $400 million. in one of the reasons he wanted a strategic partner, he did not want china to be dependent from the rest of the world and he insisted on maintaining the purity of communists doctrine. the third conversation has been published and every like to
possessors of political science speculating in the abstract about the nature of international politics. you may wonder why it was because of fact the only thing worth talking about was at that point whether we could establish enough confidence between the two of us to risky adventure that opening to china representative for both sides shown that point of view, from a domestic, political point of view. and even though the subject of president nixon to china, was the reason why i came, neither side mentioned it until about 12 hours before.
i mention not only to say i believe it should be followed to get your object it straight before you start haggling about details. we had no choice. now every generation and then was a great reform and i cannot think of any other country where you could definitely say that the evolution that we have seen in the last 30 years, depending on the vision of one man, as in the case of no other chinese who had the vision and the courage to move china into the
imaginative system and to engage the reform and instituting a market system. and the next leader, gentlemen, came into office in the aftermath of tiananmen. and he spent the better part of his 12 years in office restoring china to the international system and making china part of a genuine globalize system. which and how is the first leader actually had to operate a china as part of a globalize system. with each generation, the style of leadership has become less
personal. that is, it is treated reverentially, almost as a deity. it was never scheduled because of his health, they were suddenly called out at the meeting without being told i had of time that you were going to see him at all. and this is true of presidents and after missing the first meeting i had the opportunity to meet him more times. then, who gentile -- hu jintao
operated within the international system, working in the globalized set of structure and now we have a new generation of leaders. and they have their own challenges. for one thing, many of them -- several of them, including the vice president, and its sense of the terms to come for revolution . their fathers were that it comes. end of the dems or encourage, its grace and sent to the
countryside. one of the hatcher boots was that some of the victims were pulled out of the countryside and a sense of nationalism of the chinese good when they came concerned about the soviet red, he pulled the marshals who had been disgraced out of the countryside and said, rate me a paper on what the challenges that we have been inviting. so some of them are the sons and therefore they are happening together, with some people who may have had in regards, who are
the instruments of the revolution. but both the victims into the countryside with the common experience of this, which creates one. , but also gives them a sense of having experienced all the trials that one can imagine and who are therefore tapes of different because they have seen both challenges of the rule, the centering and have come out of it now and leadership assistance. they are facing a sense of huge
problems. the transformation over the next 10 years they have to move 400 million people from the countryside in two different cities, which of course is a huge type of problem of infrastructure, but even more than that, they know as one must know that they will lose some of the values of the countryside and the new values will be formed. nowadays the whole of the party? for love confucianism, informing these values, i think that is an unsettled issue that will occupy
china for the next 10 years. and the younger generation is a generation that has two attributes. one, they are from one child families, so it is already the family to do well. it magnifies when all the hopes of family concentrate on one person, but it also makes, prevents or obliterates cement the adjectives adjectives that have made chinese society so attractive. and the generation within
hundreds of years that never experienced. i must say some of these observations are learned from chinese leaders. i mention all of this to indicate, to deal with china that is in many respects environmental problem of american foreign policy right now. and the difficulty is that our history in cheney's history are totally different. we have been secured through most of our history. we are not countries of the impact of foreign societies paired china has always been surrounded by a multiplicity of
states, said managed has been a principal necessity of chinese foreign policy. we have dealt with problems on the short-term pragmatic places. the chinese have always, at least have learned to take a long, strategic view because one cannot decide the outcome of any one issue unless you look in a longer-term, but these two societies now have to deal with each other and have to deal in an evolving situation.
historians say china is now a racing country and the other status quo countries similar to germany and england have led to war and therefore the likelihood is something like that occurred again. remember, china is not a racing country. china is a country returning to put it believes it has always been, mainly the center of asian affairs. but it is inevitable it will impinge on the united states. but there are a number of things we need to keep in mind with respect to that.
even the country between germany and england was not inevitable and you can trace many exceptions that were made that produced a conflict that was not inherent in the situation. but be that as it may have been in retrospect. we know that none of the leaders who started world war i would have done so four years later. they let themselves be threatened into conflict on the basis of considerations in terms of the tragedy that they brought about. so therefore, i think it is a
conflict returning china in the united states would be a disaster for both countries and it would be impossible to describe what a victory would look like and it requires on both sides, patience and understanding and above all that they are sharing to reach in each country, the domestic pressures that emphasized this agreement that arise. we see that in a political campaign in which both candidates are using language about china, which i think is extremely deplorable. and you see in the chinese literature from their strategic
genders, in which their strategic analysts on a nationalistic, very nationalistic line and indeed traditional ideology diminishes. it becomes a substitute for it. many of the issues that arise, vestiges of a past that is overcome any to overcome, the so-called dotted line in the south china sea was done by some chinese emperor who would never heard of the disease because that concept didn't exist 100 years ago. so the issue of the islands a nice hundreds of islands
requires first of all separating the notion of freedom from the issue. my colleagues here will be able to give much fuller explanations of the issue. what i want to say as both sides have to make a rare mind that they are trying to do something that is historically unprecedented. the two competing companies recognize that the international system requires a degree of cooperation between them if they are not going to lift into a confrontation, which will then split every other country that will be opposed to participate and each side will be able to list the mistakes that the other side has made.
but the one favorable thing you can say about this challenges the most nonpartisan foreign policy in america today is chinese policy. eight american administration since 1971 have pursued essentially the same course. now on two occasions, new presidents try to reinvent the policy and the maximum period of time was two years. and then they reversed it because they recognize from experience the necessities of the future. so i am very hope of that this will be continued in the
relations with china are now good. there's many grievances on both sides, but the basic objective as it is recognized by both sides. but we need to do now is to find something on which we can generally cooperate, not just mitigating problems that arise. something done on both sides that engages the best minds of both sides on some common project so that we don't have to read about it in terms of the literature that we now see on both sides, which describes the other one is failing or threatening.
ifad i would begin by saying that i was asked to keep a within 15 minutes to enable you were to be able to say that she started. [laughter] you have not been privileged, but i do want you to believe what they're feeling that it is tough. there are going to be the assessment of the variance in situations that can clash. we americans have always had to view to have had gemini and asia are view including the view of those of us who are advocates of the relations. the chinese can understand the object is, but they would not
want to be pursued in a primarily military framework. so, it is for both sides to recognize that his son asia and the world in which we may not have the same interpretations, but which we can not only coexist, but operate on the important projects and night the ink stability. thank you.
>> a discussion now on campaign finance and the superpacs in the elections of the group of strategists and campaign consultants. this is hosted by the eagleton institute of politics at rutgers university and it is 90 minutes. [inaudible conversations] >> yuriko.
technology, technology. hi, good evening. i am with bendel, director of the eagleton institute of politics here at rutgers university and it is my great pleasure to welcome you to this evening special event. this is just one of many exciting events that we planned for this fall and i encourage all of you. i know many of you are in the class and there's many people to pick up the flier outside the room with details about upcoming programs. in particular want to mention that on monday, october 15 will be presenting nbc political director chuck todd at the campus center and there's still time to sign up for that event. and of course for the others. some of you may not realize that you are actually attending a session of a course. the course is called political campaigning. that has been taught at the eagleton institute of policy for
more than two decades. it has always been taught by a bipartisan team of political practitioners in collaboration with a scholar for political scientists. it of course is a perfect example of what the institute itself is aimed at. we aimed for more than half a century from now at enriching the study of policies by linking it to the world of political practice, connecting students of people whose everyday lives and work revolves around politics, government and policymaking. and what a year it is for politics. i don't think any to tell you that. and as an election-year come and there's the usual interest in the candidate and an important issues facing the country. but now, and additional focus on the political process as it
unfolds in the world of unprecedented technology he and unprecedented amounts of money. especially in the wake of the supreme court, citizens united decision, election year 2012 is a wash and many. merely drowning them at the lake, jesse ungroup, dominican and many years ago used to teach at the eagleton institute. and he described it as money and the mother's milk of politics. sometimes you might need to change the diet a little bit. the political campaigning course that she rejoined tonight is remarkable in several ways. it received the highest possible scores for students satisfaction, making it one of the top-rated courses here in new brunswick. the credit of that ranking goes to the start tears, maggie
moran, seated at the right of a set of chairs. they work with assistant research professor, david andersen. maggie is a college alumni, regular at eagleton. she is a widely admired and sought after democratic strategist. mike is also a records -- who took this as an undergraduate. he describes himself as not an outstanding student, but i'll leave it to you to judge where he's gone from there. today, mike is the nationally prominent and highly respected republican strategist. mike and maggie took over the course of its previous long-time instructors in 2009 and since then have distinguished
themselves with their extraordinary knowledge, there would incivility, especially notable because of their stances at opposite ends of the partisan spectrum. when we decided to offer a public program highlighting the influence of money in this 2012 election, we turn to mike and maggie, no wayne they would keep the discussions both informative and lively, but with a minimum of alleged that. tonight, they are joined by two experts who are working at the epicenter of political money. one of them, jonathan collegio has rutgers credentials like mike and maggie, having graduated in 2001, eagleton fellowship program. the other, jeffrey pollack doesn't have a rutgers ties, but we won't hold that against him. i do understand he has the new jersey ties.
i look forward to an enlightening conversation about an extremely important topic and i'm delighted to turn the program over to mike duchesne and maggie moran. [applause] >> at evening, records and good evening to all the supporters and of course to her students were coming over tonight in what are some pretty intense weather. i wanted make one much about my friend mike. he has great judgment. you're surprised to hear me say that about a republican, but he actually married a democrat. so i'm the most important values in life he's always made the right choice. i want to introduce to you that guess i invited tonight, jeffrey pollack. jeff is sought out by u.s. governors, president-elect of political parties, independent expenditures. he sat up by corporations and is the founder of global strategy group, which is a tremendous public affairs firm located in the city, but offices all over and he is just a tremendous
professional who has done a remarkable job in this business of making sure messages are compelling to break up the clutter. i want to thank jeff for coming. just so you know, and i think this is a really important special development, just. jeff is going to be in a movie next year. make sure you oppose watch it with bradley cooper, ryan gosling and even mendez, which was the most exciting part. it's called the place beyond the times. so is just developed this new celebrity aspect of his incredible resume come i want to give a warm welcome to just pollack. thank you for coming down. [applause] >> we are on the ground floor of your movie career. thanks everybody for coming and thanks to the students were passing it over to bush. one note, classes usually off the record. tonight it is clearly on the record, so this is a little bit different for class. we hope everybody will as well.
on the republican side, jonathan collegio is here. john is one of the foremost communications professionals among both the world of politics and beyond. read any stretch of two medications for american crossroads, which is the largest as a group right now playing in the political world. he also is director of television for the national association of broadcasters. when he and i worked in the same building last decade, where he was press secretary of the undersea, also deputy chief staff at patrick henry on the host a lot of experience on the governmental side as those political side and brings a wealth of experience to this election cycle and many in the past. so welcome. hi mark [applause] i will try to set the stage for tonight. we will have a lot of q&a people ask each of our speakers to talk about projects they work on this year which is a great case study. we tried to use the current election going on is the key city for this class, but the
overview tonight really is about money in politics and this has been a very different year for money in politics. we talked about citizens united has an open door for a lot more outside money coming into the political spectrum. we want to talk about what to denning, both in an academic sense in terms of house campaign-finance reform in campaigns and outside groups, the specifically how it affects the selection. we will talk to the presidential election, but there's an awful lot as well. it is important to note this is not entirely new. while it is different this year certainly, it is not brand-new. it's not the first time it's been outside money. public 2010, 2008 or even 2004. the candidates have always been outside groups. certainly in our recent history these outside groups 527 organizations that are outside the campaign structure, outside the campaign-finance limits of the candidate, but can navigate for the election a defeat of candidates as long as they follow certain rules and do not coordinate with the campaign.
the different party committees have independent expenditure units, but the rnc, dnc congressional committees and senate committees on each side have their own independent expenditures as well as groups outside and completely unattached to candidates whatsoever. with citizens united you have super superpacs at a presidential level. you cannot congressional level, usn local community may. people wonder how that will move going forward. it's the first or they've been tremendously about. in my opinion had a dramatic effect on what happened in terms of extending it. i was the first time that happened. is that these gentlemen are doing to try to figure it out. there is no playbook. it's the first time there's been that much change going on on the side of things. it's kind of an overview of where we go. talk about campaign finance reform initiatives and near ruin opinions and questions as well. who set the stage by lenny
gentlemen talk about projects and then we'll go into discussions. >> jeff, what to with we do and understand, this entire room has no familiarity with these kinds of vehicles. give us a sense of the pro-obama factor which are a strategist practitioner and tell us how it functions among others come together and how did they get funded? was the mission and priorities u.s.a. and if you could give us a sense of the message strategy and planning that goes on and what value it as it does not add. >> thank you again for having me. it's a pleasure to be here. i wish i could say it's a pleasure to talk about the super packs in the election. it is not. the supreme court made a strange decision that has allowed these entities to exist and unfortunately that has an escalation of these superpacs that are supporting one candidate. it's not just in presidential.
in random congressional races you have superpacs were one or two donors get together and put a million dollars or $2 million into a superpac organization to influence the auction. and that is never happened before in that kind of way. that assertive and historic point. and as many of you may now come a president obama of course had a very strong opinion that this was wrong, a very strong opinion about campaign finance. and he didn't like the superpacs. so for a long time, there was no serta presidential blessing for a superpac to exist. so we were actually late to the game. you reduce u.s.a. action, which is the sub 10 supporting barack obama was late to foreign and late to get started. and late to raise money, more importantly. it was started by john sweeney
and bill burton, who would come out of the white house. sean, who has served as chief of staff to rahm emanuel, the single worst title, chief of staff, chief of staff. and did a great job. and the two of them had left the white house to start his superpac and begin the process of trying to help barack obama get reelected. and it started out slow. the way to raise money is to go to donors that are interesting in helping the president, who were shot at interest in trying to help the president. and it's a very different fundraising strategy. it is for a lot of them you think about barack obama and the power of his campaign in 2008. what we know is how much of that is fueled by little donations, by people in this terms spending $5 or $3 or whatever it is in the ucs and the small donors.
well come you can't do that. you are serta spending your time trying to go out and raise six figures, seven figures. it's not a common thing. sure i cannot do under 50 bucks for some charity and helping. can i have a million bucks? that's a tough conversation. and so, that is the way that it happened in terms of the beginning and how it's grown. since then, priorities u.s.a. has become successful in raising money and more importantly, i think i priorities has been an important part of setting the agenda in part with the presidential campaign. i will show you an ad that we did that i think that a lot of influence. what can collect the ads for a minute, you're going to see -- and one back -- so, i'm going to
show you an ad that priorities put together. it's going to be the add-on will last. so priorities, we had done -- egregious holder for one action and it starts. so priorities, as maggie said, i served for priorities u.s.a. it's way to the polling and research along with the very talented and brilliant jeff garin. the two of us to the pulling together. my firm also serves as the digital advertising, meaning whatever is advertised on the internet, my firm has helped them to serve out to all of you. and as that is a really interesting one. and the research, what we found was something that i wish i could say we found. newt gingrich ran a campaign
against mitt romney about mitt romney's register on pain capital and how he made his money. and newt gingrich solved it. not only newt gingrich, but with the help of one of the super packs, funded by not a nice man. >> speak for yourself. innocuous and nice man to mitt romney as you all may recall. was the mayor like an added the beginning about bain capital that they put on the internet? the point is newt gingrich and some of the republican attack mitt romney on his record as being. it was an important part of the story to talk about how mitt romney had made his money, was an important table setting. it's not that anyone has anything against mitt romney for
being rich, but we all make our choices in terms of how we make money. and so, this is one of the, probably the most powerful add that i think we've done. other consultants had taught about his conversation is very powerful. so check this out and we'll talk about it. >> not knowing what it was for. just days later, all three ships were told to assemble into our house a group of people walked out on that stage and told that that the plant is now closed and all of you are fired. i look both ways. i looked at the crowd and we all just lost our jobs. we don't have an income. mitt romney made over $100 million by shutting down power plant and devastated our
lives. turns out that when we built that stage, it was like hoping my own coffin, and it just made me sick. >> priorities u.s.a. action is responsible for the content. >> out of the blue when they were told to build -- >> so pretty powerful add, powerful because it's a real story. powerful because it sets the table is a set in terms of what mitt romney's priorities were peered out from a visual perspective, this ad was seen shooting the visitors 2 million times on youtube and most impressively, it was seen in the swing states. so this is the kind of advertising we decided to run in swing states, particularly in a place like ohio, for example, where blue-collar downscale boaters were looking for this kind of information and saw the priorities of mitt romney and i think this is very important as
setting the stage for the rest of the campaign. i will show you one more added and i promise to shut out. it is not on not d., negative. some of it was gone. here is one we did leading up to the olympics. >> there is mitt romney waving to china, home to a billion people, thousands of their jobs to mitt romney. india, which also gained jobs thanks to romney with outsourcing pioneer. and burma -- we know they have a special place in mitt romney's wallet. the swiss sure know how to keep a secret. speaking of secrets, there's bermuda, home to a secret corporation. no one knows why and romney
walked hal. and the cayman islands, where romney keeps millions to avoid u.s. taxes. you've got to say this about mitt romney, he sure knows how to go to the gold for himself. >> so the u.s. olympic committee was not that accurate as you might expect. and so, that ad was a little bit short-lived, but got a lot of coverage and views on the internet. and kudos to the later buyers, to priorities who came up with the idea for that ad, david iker bomb who created these ads. but, it's a lot of fun to do what we'd do for a living. priorities has been a great experience and as money has
fallen -- sort of flowed i should say, into the superpacs in general, but also priorities has played an important role in this campaign. not the kind of role though that my colleague has a crossroads. >> so there is a bit of a difference here. john works for american crossroads, which is not the romney super pack. there is a counterpart to priorities u.s.a. which embraced specifically that. american crossroads has spent more money and has been around much longer. maybe you can talk a little bit about the decision to do that. obviously came out much earlier and saw a lot of what was going to happen before it happened. talk about the beginning of that and i was honestly no presidential candidate started much earlier and start of not only presidential but beyond. >> all go back even earlier than 2010. i think you have to go back
previous to the campaign finance reform act of 22, must you talk about where political parties. if you're at the rnc or dnc and you could solicit a million dollars from a paper union by wealthy individual and then you could spend the money had he won it. congress decided that wasn't a good idea. they cap the amount raised by individuals, but they couldn't cap the spending because it protected by the first amendment. if any of you want to but not on the air to talk about what you believe in, that's protected by the first amendment. what it happened over a period of time if people think it is a center right thing but all these cheng li are going on. it was actually development by the left. what happened by the presidential reelected george w. bush, three left-wing billionaires, george soros, peter lewis raise $200 million
for a series of organizations together and try to defeat president bush. so this type of structure had been found for a long period of time. another thing gone on even longer with labor union participation, specifically democrats. in election after election, it is the biggest spending of the labor unions. and when karl rove and ed gillespie started looking at the 2010 elections, they realized that while big labor, which is $400 billion to a public president upon the 2008, there was no corollary that existed on the right to spend large amounts of money for house and senate. so karl rove smartly started american crossroads. it was interesting. i was working across her as an and president obama actually attacked carr wrote in february
seeking a legal money from china, which was funny. as soon as he said that comeau we saw an uptick in america grassroots funding. the reason for that was president obama had identified us and we ended up shattering her fund raising goals by the 2010 election and the rest is history. that is really really where this is that we view ourselves as a counterbalance. in fact, in 2010, you can think of the crossroads has been the biggest thing in the 2010 election network. the expenditures were by the american federation of state and county municipal employees. the labor union of the bureaucrats on the capital's. the second biggest spending group is the u.s. chamber, but then fbi you, service employees international union and the national education association,
a first-year teachers unions. the three of the top five spending were labor unions and were very disclosed every month. a lot of what labor does is not disclosed at the same way. they have not been visible. idea back between 20,792,011, impacting the political process of the state and local level. it's a lot of money in politics, but a lot of people are talking about were the most money is coming from. this alternative back. >> so american crossroads is very quivery active in the presidential election.
if you go in today with $12 million -- >> this is a president obama said the jobless or would be if we pass the stimulus is 5.6%. but this is where the jobless rate actually is. 8.1%. the difference? about 3.7 million jobs. obama spending was $5 trillion deeper in debt and now we have fewer jobs than when he started. but obama promised versus what he delivered. >> american crossers is responsible for the content of this advertising. >> oppose the president. we were talking about how to legislation spent $800 billion on a strain to fix the economy. they spend the money and the job
soon follow. but we got was dead. when you talk about in those terms, here's what the president sold to the american people on how to fix the economy. these are the results are not only not create a job, it created a lot of debt that we now have to pay off. a lot of money, not a lot of results. we tried to hold a lack of officials to account for the record and also for the promises that they have made. a lot of incumbent politicians don't like us because there's a lot of people doing it on a very large lawful. >> it is important to one of the things we talk about is targeting. it is important living here between new york and philadelphia market you'll not see any of these most likely. pennsylvania historically has been a target state. right now neither campaign are super pack really advertise in the philadelphia media market is the most expensive market in the target state, that he would talk about it or nine states is also important to remember as a lot of money that is concentrated to a very small number of states and ultimately a small number of people not all member states.
that is something very important to remember. a big thing is to campaign finance reform and the unintended consequences and students in the class. that is one of my pet peeves have been attending consequences. that is something of a kick in into sas questions. were going to give maggie a chance here to respond, i didn't want to become the moderator here, but somehow that happen. we would let the students to take questions here. first dibs on the students in the class. anyone else feel free as well. microphones are there if you want to get yourself on c-span. go say hello to anybody you know, but you can tell people when you run. it'll be great. anyone with the campaign finance reform, more specifically if you know what there might be any outside groups are passed outside groups in 2004. i will turn the floor over to maggie. >> just a couple points. one of the things that fascinates me when folks discuss this issue is a talk often about the role of unions and labor.
what is interesting about organized labor is they've been under a series of roles for years, especially the federal department of labor and those rules have gotten more and more strict. for example, if you're rank-and-file member of the union you have an opt-out checkoff in order to agree, to let your money, 5 cents per hour or whatever it might be the representative. when i go to the store to buy a soda, i didn't sign on to whatever company is on minnesota's political agenda. i didn't choose that. so what company mixed revenue and then takes that revenue ended now putting it into massive amounts into an agenda and corrupting the political process potentially with a massive influence of wealthy, wealthy dollars coming from large-scale corporations is not a comparison you can make two units per say in how they find traditional. citizens united did for unions would it do for corporations as well. they can spend money on if any of their counts, but they do
have to report their expensively out of labor. jeff and i were talking earlier about to us winning this money race. you want to walk through those numbers? >> you put up the one chart. these are my numbers. you can impose anything you want from open secrets to a picture. you can see the ad spending will come up. look up top. this right there tells you the amount of spending and spending that's been done. american crossroads 59, restore our future 41, americans for prosperity 36. those are the top three. all those republicans. you can get the 22.7 for the dnc, 21 for the rnc, 17.5 for the rnc mitt romney committee. four of those five are republican entities. and yes, barack obama has had a lot of money, too. i'm not trying to go past that,
but i'd say the obama campaign has a tremendous amount of money. when you look at the superpacs come it is very clear the republicans have dominated. restore our future has spent $87 million this cycle. a part of that was beating out newt gingrich -- or rick perry, or whoever was the flavor of the week of the republican primary. but $87 million. and crossroads, 30 million overall. and after that, club for growth. this is massive amounts of money in this cycle. so i just think it is what it is. it's the reality we are dealing with why we are here today to talk about it and it's a very difficult thing for campaigns to deal with. >> some of that is important and looking at the practical matter of this campaign, the president -- president obama's campaign is spending significantly governor promised campaign on television. but you're right, with the outside groups, if you aggregate the president and groups on the
left and governor romney and groups on the right, it is governor romney site come if he will come it has a heavier weight. it is relatively close, but it is an aggregate on that side. that is an important part of campaign finance reform. this used to be the party committee, the republican national committee eusebio to do this and it is important to note that as well finances the reform has come and the accountable are the candidates themselves. they have to go out, stands behind the ads in fact authorize this. they are ultimately the people voted on. the next player i would be the party committees because they are controlled by the elected officials or party folks. they are held to account. the closes thing other than two candidates. this well-intentioned campaign finance reform to put it out. if you see the dgi and rga on the committee side, they figure that out right away and you have done this and this is the result of a lot of people well-intentioned thinking that
money has no place in politics. they ended up putting money outside. so they are outside of the candidates. the sheer spending by the candidates in the past, well before 2002 was basically closer to 50/50. one can do this then how come the other candidate has been a half. if you're on the wrong side of jon corzine is like 75, 25. [inaudible] >> not the first time. [laughter] >> so you have this come of it as you move back into the party committees to an independent expenditure in ads, which actually still is an unintended consequence and mistake that should be able to work with the candidate and the campaign. but you start squeezing the amount of money spent by the candidates in the party committees are filling up. so what is happening is rather than each candidate trying to get about 50% of what it sat on the air, each candidate is now getting 20% of what is spent on the air and the other 60%, probably even